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This article assesses possible revisions to the Articles of Agree-
ment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)I and
to the GATT Subsidies Code2 in order to address the problem of
trade distortion arising from government subsidization of the pro-
duction and sale of mineral products in their raw and refined forms.
This problem frequently is most visible with regard to the state-trad-
ing enterprises (STE) operating in the minerals industries. 3 The pa-
per concludes that revision of GATT Article XVII regarding STE
activities is warranted; however, attaining meaningful GAT disci-
pline also requires the revision of other GATT provisions. Such pro-
visions would include Article VI concerning unilateral application of
countervailing duties (CVD),4 Article XVI concerning multilateral
Vice President, Economic Consulting Services, Inc., Washington, D.C. B.A. 1968,
Trinity College; M.B.A. 1988, George Washington University; Ph.D. 1981, Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A- 1l, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT
(K. Simmonds & B. Hill eds. 1989) [hereinafter GATT].
GATT is the principal international body concerned with global trade. GATT is not
actually an organization, but is an agreement that sets out a code of rules by which coun-
tries trade, as well as a forum for resolving disputes. Signed in 1947 as an interim agree-
ment, GATT is now a formal multilateral agreement with the goal of expanding and
liberalizing world trade. The rules of GATT' are intended to provide specific discipline
over the use of trade barriers and to help reduce confusion and uncertainty in the interna-
tional trade arena. GATT also provides a forum in which countries can attempt to resolve
trade disputes and to carry out negotiations aimed at reducing tariff and nontariff trade
barriers.
2 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619,
26 GATT BISD Supp. 56, entered into force Jan. 1, 1980 [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
3 See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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discipline on subsidies,5 and the Subsidies Code providing interpre-
tive guidance for both Article VI and Article XVI. 6
Section II of this paper describes and analyzes the particular
problem that the U.S. mining and minerals industry faces with re-
gard to foreign government subsidization practices and their relation
to STEs. 7 The central problem arises from the cyclical, commodity
nature of the market for the industry's products and STE efforts to
shift the burden of adjusting to market changes from itself to private
producers in other countries.
The third section of the paper assesses the current GATT disci-
pline on mineral industry subsidization.8 The section first analyzes
Article XVII in terms of the discipline it provides concerning STE
operations and governmental subsidization of STEs. The section
then addresses the scope of and limitations on unilateral action by
the U.S. industry in a CVD proceeding under U.S. trade law as per-
mitted by Article VI. 9 Finally, this section contains an analysis of the
utility of Article XVI's multilateral procedures from the U.S. mineral
industry's perspective.
The paper's fourth section provides suggestions for the revision
of Article XVII, Article VI, Article XVI, and the Subsidies Code in
order to address the U.S. industry's special problems with foreign
government subsidy practices, particularly with regard to STEs.10
An opportunity to achieve such revision exists in the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations currently underway in Geneva."
II. The Problem of Government Subsidization of STEs
The term STE can refer to enterprises with a variety of organiza-
tional or ownership structures. Although an STE need not be owned
entirely by the government, the STE will generally have some type of
government equity participation or be subject to other legal author-
ity by which the government can influence the operational decisions
5 See infra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 29-72 and accompanying text.
9 GATT Article VI authorizes individual GATT member countries to take unilateral
action to counter the injurious impact of foreign subsidy and dumping practices. GATT,
supra note 1, art. VI, at 12. It provides the GAT sanction for the U.S. CVD law. 19
U.S.C. § 1671 (1988).
10 See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
II The United States and 96 other member countries of GATT are participating in a
four-year negotiation on a variety of trade-related issues under the auspices of GATT.
LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GAT 28-29 (K. Simmonds & B. Hill eds. 1989). The
current negotiations, which are termed the "Uruguay Round," were initiated in September
1986 at a meeting of GATT representatives at Punta Del Este, Uruguay. These negotia-
tions are the eighth round held by the GATT. The seventh round from 1973 to 1979 was
termed the "Tokyo Round" based on the site of the agreement for its initiation. Id. at 14.
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of the enterprise.' 2 The STE's obligation to conform to government
direction on operational matters, such as production and employ-
ment, most clearly distinguishes it from purely private firms.' 3
Stemming from such governmental involvement, another distin-
guishing feature of an STE is that it may pursue multiple goals, not
just profit maximization.' 4 As a public or quasi-public institution, an
STE may serve as a governmental instrument to further a variety of
social, economic, or political objectives. Such objectives might in-
clude, inter alia, the creation and maintenance of employment, the
development of particular regions of the country, and the generation
of foreign exchange. It is in the willingness to sacrifice commercial
interests in the furtherance of other priorities that STEs inflict eco-
nomic distortion on the world trading system. 15
12 STEs have existed virtually for as long as there have been states. In modem his-
tory the Dutch of the sixteenth century, and later the British were very much involved in
promoting the business activities of their respective trading organizations. The expansion
of socialism in the twentieth century made STEs the only form of trade organization for a
number of countries. A significant transition in the types and number of STEs has taken
place since the end of World War II. In the late 1940s, most state-owned enterprises in
noncommunist countries were public utilities. Since then there has been a growth in the
activity of noncommunist, non-utility STEs, particularly in developing countries and in the
natural resource sector including products such as crude oil, copper, iron ore, and
phosphate. For a discussion of the expansion of STE activity, see R. VERNON, EXPLORING
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: EMERGING ISSUES IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT ch. 6 (1985).
13 U.S. nonmineral industries have also criticized STEs for a wide variety of practices
which they consider to be trade distorting. Such practices include, for example, official
import monopolies (e.g., the Japanese and French tobacco import monopolies), industrial
targeting, and counter-trade requirements imposed on foreign purchasers or suppliers.
The highly diverse array of practices tends to have in common the potential for effective
host government influence in transactions. This influence tends to be directed at the es-
tablishment of price, the terms of payment, and access to the market. While these STE
practices focus on purchasing and selling activities, the practices of concern to the' miner-
als industry primarily concern STE production decisions made without appropriate regard
to the commodity's price. See State Trading Enterprises: Hearing on S. 2660 Before the Subcomm.
on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1986) (State-
ment of John H. Paul on behalf of the American Mining Congress). For a brief discussion
of S. 2660, see infra note 72.
14 Although STEs in the minerals sector operate with varying degrees of concern for
profit maximization, the mineral STEs of some countries have shown relatively little con-
cern for commercial success. Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, Zaire, and Zambia are notable
among such countries in the noncommunist world. In the socialist bloc, countries such as
the Soviet Union and those in Eastern Europe have rarely given commercial success the
highest operational priority. With the prospect of GAIT membership and most-favored
nation tariff benefits, the Soviet Union's role as a STE mineral exporter could expand
dramatically. For extensive discussion of the conflict between a STE's commercial and
noncommercial objectives, see STATE TRADE IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (M. Kostecki ed. 1982) and R.
MONSEN & K. WALTERS, NATIONALIZED COMPANIES: A THREAT TO AMERICAN BUSINESS
(1983). For discussions focusing on the minerals industry, see M. RADETZKI, STATE MIN-
ERAL ENTERPRISES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THEIR IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL MINERAL
MARKETS (1985); Labys, The Role of State Trading in Mineral Commodity Markets, in STATE
TRADE IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES (M. Kostecki ed. 1982).
15 Under optimal free trade and full employment conditions, economic theory sug-
gests that all countries produce at the point on their production possibilities frontiers at
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Government subsidization of STEs is a problem primarily be-
cause it permits STE producers to transfer to non-STE private com-
panies the adjustment burden that STE producers are unwilling to
accept themselves during periods of cyclical downturn in minerals
demand.16 Absent such subsidies the burden of adjustment to cycli-
cal market forces is distributed among producers more in accordance
with relative economic efficiencies.' 7
Generally, the trade distortions arising from STE operations in
the minerals industry are less acutely felt during periods of relatively
high demand and therefore relatively high price. 18 During such cyc-
lical peaks product prices will normally permit recovery of operating
costs and capital costs as well as profit. However, during periods of
cyclical downturn in demand the impact of STE practices can be-
come highly damaging. 19 When the unit price falls below full oper-
which the domestic price ratios equal the international trade price ratios. It is under these
conditions that (1) each country achieves its maximum welfare, and (2) the allocation of
the world's resources is most efficient. Any price distortion (such as a tariff or subsidy)
which moves production away from this point reduces world welfare as well as the effi-
ciency of resource allocation. For a discussion of the impact of economic distortions on
welfare, see R. CAVES & R. JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS 205-10 (1985).
A subsidy to a STE reduces the operating and capital costs faced by the producer and,
hence, increases profitability. The subsidy thereby causes an outward shift in the firm's
supply curve and artificially encourages additional production of one product which in
turn draws resources, such as labor and capital, away from the production of other prod-
ucts. This change from the optimal production pattern for the country causes a reduction
in its welfare and an inefficient allocation of its and the world's resources. See M.
CHACHOLIADES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND POLICY 503-04 (1978). See also CAVES
& JONES, supra, at 252-54.
16 The distortion from state-trading enterprises arises in the following manner: Con-
sider two firms, one STE and one non-STE, with the non-STE being slightly more efficient
than the STE (i.e., having a slightly lower average variable cost (AVC)). If the STE's AVC
after reduction (or offset) by the subsidy is less than the AVC of the non-STE, the market
will not operate efficiently. In such a case, when prices fall, the more efficient firm (the
non-STE) will stop producing rather than the less efficient firm (the STE).
17 The basic economic logic underlying this conclusion is as follows: The aggregate
market supply curve for a product is the sum of the individual producing-firms' supply
curves for the product. At any price an efficient firm supplies a quantity determined by its
marginal cost curve so long as the price exceeds the firm's AVC. If price does not exceed
AVC, the firm supplies no product to the market because the variable cost to produce each
unit is less than the per unit revenue received. Economic theory predicts, therefore, that
in the presence of a cyclical downturn in a product's price, firms with AVCs which exceed
the new, lower market price will suspend production. See J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 140-43 (1980) (discussing individ-
ual firm and market supply functions).
is Fluctuations in the prices of mineral products, such as copper, lead, and zinc, tend
to reflect shifts in the level of industrial activity in the overall economy. Over the period
between 1970 and 1988, for example, trends in world prices for these products generally
followed the trends of gross national product (GNP) growth for the United States and the
industrialized world. See METAL STATISTICS 1988, at 59, 88, & 204; 1988 ECONOMIC RE-
PORT OF THE PRESIDENT, table B-5, at 255 (GNP data from the Council of Economic Advis-
ers); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 1 NATIONAL
AcCouNTs: 1960-1987 MAIN AGGREGATES table R.I.19 Commodity prices can be highly volatile. During the 1974-75 recession, for exam-
ple, world copper prices fell by 40%. WORLD BANK, 1987-88 COMMODITY TRADE AND
PRICE TRENDS 84. Within 1989 alone monthly average prices per pound fluctuated
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ating and capital cost, a profit-maximizing producer must consider
whether it can afford to continue operations over an extended pe-
riod.20 If prices fall below variable cost the private firm may be
forced to curtail operations because it loses money on each unit that
it produces. 2' It would only resume operations when prices rise to a
level sufficient to permit variable cost recovery and, ultimately, re-
newed profitability. 22
STEs, however, may not operate in a similar manner. As prices
fall, a government may be unwilling to let an STE mineral producer
curtail uneconomic operations because to do so would result in po-
litically or socially unprofitable levels of unemployment. 23 There-
greatly. Copper prices fell from $1.58 inJanuary to $1.13 inJuly (28% decline), then rose
to $1.38 in August (22% increase from July), and fell again to $1.09 by December (21%
decrease from August). Metals Week compilation of monthly averages for 1989.
20 Over the long term a firm must cover all of its costs or it must leave the industry.
Such costs include a "normal profit" as a necessary return to capital. For a presentation of
the basic economic concept of the "long-run break-even condition," see P. SAMUELSON &
W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 544-46 (13th ed. 1989).
21 For an analysis of the "shutdown price" for a firm, see R. LErwICH & R. ECKERT,
THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 317-19 (9th ed. 1985).
22 A member of the U.S. copper industry characterizes the marketing strategies of
developing country STEs as disastrous for the global copper industry:
The copper industry, when controlled by private investment, would re-
act to economic downturns in conventional fashion, by restricting production
and withholding copper from the market. The CIPEC [Intergovernmental
Council of Copper Exporting Countries] nations were motivated by a differ-
ent set of factors, including employment considerations, the need for foreign
exchange, and social/political costs of production curtailments.
Thus, when demand fell off during a recession, instead of curtailing de-
liveries to the market, the CIPEC countries would maintain them, or if possi-
ble, increase them.
Tateosian, The Copper Industry is Still Changing: The Short-Term Policies of CIPEC Are Seen as a
Disturbing Influence, American Metal Market-Copper Club, Feb. 6; 1990, at 10A.
23 An STE may, in effect, treat labor costs for a certain size work force as a fixed cost
rather than as a variable cost as is normally the case. As such, the STE might be willing to
continue producing even when the market price covers only the remaining variable costs.
In a number of STE countries the importance of employment considerations is heightened
by the fact that mineral deposits may be located in remote or underdeveloped regions
where mineral mining and processing operations are primary or even exclusive sources of
employment. A case in point is Zambia, where a majority of the copper industry is state
owned. One study of Zambian copper operations concluded that there is "strong social
and political pressure to avoid labor force reductions." RADETZKI, supra note 14, at 125; see
id at ch. 6. The Radetzki study suggests that:
[M]anagement has discouraged the introduction of labor-saving innovations
and the government will not accept closures of installations that would result
in large-scale labor redundancies, unless alternative employment opportuni-
ties for the redundant labor could be provided.
Id. at 114.
The Radetzki study also assessed Venezuela's STE producing iron ore. Although at
that time (1982) it did not find strong evidence of uneconomic expansion of mine capacity,
it did find a consensus among company and government officials that "profit maximization
is not a company goal." Id. at 94. More important goals were (1) the "assurance of raw
material supply to the domestic steel industry, presumably meaning that delivery to satisfy
domestic needs should have priority over export deliveries" and (2) development in the
mining region. Id. at 95. However, in 1989, according to the World Bank, Venezuela's
iron ore STE was selling to the state-owned Sidor steel company at only 56% of the export
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
fore, the government may be willing to provide the STE with some
form of subsidy to permit it to continue operation when it would
otherwise shut down. Likewise, the STE may be a strategic source of
foreign exchange revenue for the government. The government
may be willing to provide a local currency subsidy to the STE in or-
der to continue the flow of STE foreign exchange receipts.2 4
The effect of such STE overproduction during periods of rela-
tively low demand is to depress or suppress further the price of the
mineral product and to delay further the time when prices could re-
turn to levels permitting non-STE companies to operate at accepta-
ble profitability.25 Absent such government subsidies to STEs the
global supply would respond to demand changes more smoothly and
with less severe disruption to the private producers around the
world.26 The countries subsidizing their STE mineral companies in
this manner are in effect transferring the burden of cyclical adjust-
ment from their own economies to the economies of non-STE
countries.2 7
price in order to help support the loss-plagued steel company. Sweeney, Venezuela Seeks
Export Markets for Sidor's Steel: Despite $7 Billion Investment, Complex Near Collapse, American
Metal Market, Dec. 18, 1989, at 4. The steel company's labor force was reportedly twice
the size required for truly efficient operations. See id.
24 For certain countries in which mineral products are among a relatively small array
of exportable products, limiting mineral exports could slow the inflow of foreign exchange
needed to purchase imports. For example, copper export earnings as a percent of total
export earnings reached 85% for Zambia, INT'L MONETARY FUND, INT'L FINANCIAL STATIS-
Tics 228 (Sep. 1989), 49% for Chile, Id. at 293, 23% for Peru, Id. at 636, and 20% for
Zaire, Id. at 754 (for each country the ratios were calculated by dividing IFS line 70c by line
70 for 1988). Other mineral commodities can also play this central role. For example,
Surinam's exports are 64% alumina. Id. at 366 (ratio is IFS line 70cr divided by line 70 for
1987). Morocco's exports are 12% phosphate. Id. at 686 (ratio is IFS line 70ar divided by
line 70 for 1988). Brazil's exports are 6% iron ore. Id. at 223 (ratio is IFS line 70gd
divided by line 70 for 1988). Local currency subsidies would cover costs for expenses such
as local labor, electric power, and local freight.
25 As price falls, some STEs may actually increase production in order to maintain
total foreign exchange receipts. Such a motivation was possibly involved as copper prices
fell by 52% in real (inflation adjusted) terms during the period between 1980 and 1986,
while copper producti'on increased in Chile by 16% and in Zaire by 107% over the same
period. However, copper production in the major non-STE countries of Canada and the
United States fell. WORLD BANK, supra note 19, at 84. Refined copper production data
from AMERICAN BUREAU OF METAL STATISTICS, NON-FERROUS METAL DATA 1982 at 11 and
AMERICAN BUREAU OF METAL STATISTICS, NON-FERROUS METAL DATA 1988 at 11.
26 For the various mineral products that are produced as byproducts or coproducts of
the production of other minerals, the price and cost relationships may be more complex.
Even for non-STE firms, the volume of production of a byproduct mineral may vary as
much in accordance with the price of the firm's main mineral product as with the price of
the byproduct itself.
27 See CHACHOLIADES supra note 15, at 503-05 (regarding economic distortions).
Chacholiades states that although a government may try to correct some distortion in the
domestic economy through some protective measure for an industry such as a subsidy,
"protection remedies a domestic distortion at the expense of a foreign distortion." Id. at
505.
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III. Current GATT Discipline on Subsidization in the Mineral
Industry
Subsidization of the mineral industry encouraging uneconomic
production during periods of cyclical downturn, particularly by
STEs, is largely unreachable under current GAT disciplines. 28
A. Article XVII-State-Trading Enteprises
Article XVII addresses in only a limited way the conduct of state-
trading enterprises. 29 In particular, it does not address the issues
related to production volume or the subsidization of production
costs which are important concerns of the U.S. minerals industries.
Indeed, the concept of consistency with "commercial considera-
tions" cited in the article3° has very limited applicability.
Paragraph 1 of Article XVII requires that STEs accord "non-
discriminatory treatment" in their purchases and sales involving im-
ports and exports by private traders. 3 ' The basic requirement for
non-discriminatory treatment is provided in subparagraph (a).32
28 STE practices have long been an issue of concern in multilateral trade discussions
and present very difficult definitional and political problems. Indeed, even the Draft Char-
ter for the International Trade Organization (ITO)-the abortive precursor to the
GATT--contained provisions devoted to restrictive business practices, including STE
practices. In the establishment of GATT, key STE sections of the ITO Draft Charter's
Article 29 were carried over virtually unchanged into GATT Article XVII. During these
early deliberations, just as today, a controversial issue was the degree of state "control"
necessary in order for an entity to be considered a STE. For a detailed history of the early
GATT consideration of STE issues, seeJ. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT
(1969).
29 The early concern in GAIT with STEs was not so much with STE operations per
se, but rather that a country would use STEs in a discriminatory manner in order to nullify
tariff and other benefits received by other countries during trade negotiations. A tariff
concession granted by a country could be nullified if its STE import agents refused to
make purchases from particular countries. See State-Trading Enterprises: Hearings on S. 2660
Before the Subcom. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
20, 22 (1986) (Statement of Alan F. Holmer, General Counsel, U.S. Trade
Representative).
30 GATT, supra note 1, art. XVII, para. 1(b), at 38. Subparagraph (b) states:
The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) [regarding nondiscrimination] ...
shall be understood to require that such enterprises shall ... make any such
purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations ...
and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate op-
portunity ... to compete for participation in such purchases or sales.
Id.
31 Id. There is dispute whether "non-discriminatory treatment" requires merely that
an STE afford most-favored nation treatment (i.e., all foreign countries are treated alike)
or whether the STE must also provide national treatment (i.e., treat foreign countries in
the same way as domestic suppliers). Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. State-
ment on Article XVII. Negotiating Group on GATT Articles 3 (May 25, 1988).
32 GAIT, supra note 1, art. XVII, para. 1 (a), at 38. Subparagraph (a) states:
Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes, or maintains a
State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise .... exclusive
or special privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving
either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the general princ-
pies of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this agreement ....
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There is a reference in subparagraph (b) to the concept of operating
"in accordance with commercial considerations," but that reference
appears merely to provide interpretive guidance on how the non-
discriminatory treatment cited in subparagraph (a) is to be achieved.
It appears that the purpose of acting "in accordance with commercial
considerations" is the avoidance of discriminatory treatment among
other countries. Thus, so long as the STE acts in a non-discrimina-
tory manner it is at least arguable that Article XVII imposes no sepa-
rate obligation to act "in accordance with commercial
considerations.' '3
Furthermore, even if one could interpret the article as not being
limited in its scope to "purchases or sales," the concerns of the min-
eral industry would still not be met. Phrasing in subparagraph (b)
provides explanatory guidance for the meaning of "commercial con-
siderations" but excludes the concepts of cost and production.3 4
The provision merely enumerates a list of commercial considerations
that clearly focuses only on the purchasing and selling functions of
an organization (i.e., selecting among potential buyers or sellers of a
product), s5 It does not address the underlying circumstances of the
product's production or the circumstance in which its profitability
was assessed.
No other paragraph of Article XVII imposes any significant limi-
o tation on STE activities. Paragraph 2, in fact, provides an exemption
from the constraints of non-discriminatory treatment and associated
commercial considerations with regard to imports by an STE when
the products are for governmental consumption.3 6 Paragraph 3 ac-
knowledges that an STE "might be operated so as to create serious
obstacles to trade" and simply states that "negotiations... designed
to limit or reduce such obstacles are of importance to the expansion
of international trade."37 There is no further reference to any
Id.
33 In testimony before Congress concerning the "commercial considerations" provi-
sion, the General Counsel of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative stated that "[t]his
obligation extends only to purchases and sales of goods ... " State Trading Enterprises:
Hearings on S. 2660 Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 22 (1986) (Statement of Alan F. Holmer, General Counsel, U.S.
Trade Representative).
34 GATT, supra note 1, art. XVII, para. 1 (b), at 38.
3,, Id. The text of Article XVII, subparagraph (b) cites "commercial considerations,
including, price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of
purchase or sale." Id.
36 Id., art. XVII, para. 2, at 38. Paragraph 2 states:
[P]aragragh I of this Article shall not apply to imports of products for
immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not otherwise
for resale or use in the production of goods for sale. With respect to such
imports, each contracting party shall accord to the trade of the other con-
tracting parties fair and equitable treatment.
Id.
37 Id., art. XVII, para. 3, at 38-39.
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Paragraph 4 does establish certain notification obligations.38
First, it requires all countries to report to GATT the products that
are imported or exported by an STE.3 9 Second, countries having an
STE with an import monopoly on a product must report the import
markup imposed on the product if another country requests such in-
formation. 40 Third, at the request of a member country believing
that it is adversely affected by the STE activities of another country,
GATT may request the other country to supply information about its
STE operations. 4' However, a country need not report what it con-
siders to be "confidential information" in complying with any of the
article's notification requirements.42
In sum, Article XVII confers certain exemptions from GATT
discipline and imposes some limitations. None of the limitations,
however, meaningfully address the STE subsidy concerns of the U.S.
minerals industry.
B. Article VI-Unilateral CVD Sanctions
Article VI permits a GATT signatory unilaterally to impose
countervailing duties (CVD) on imports from another country to off-
set government subsidies so long as the imports are causing, or
threaten to cause, "material injury" to the domestic industry of the
importing country.43 The array of actionable subsidies is relatively
broad, including a "bounty or subsidy" that has been "granted, di-
rectly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of
such product in the country of origin or exportation, including any
special subsidy to the transportation of a particular product. '44 Pro-
duction subsidies are explicitly included in the actionable list.45
There are, however, two key limitations on the applicability of
Article VI to the U.S. industry's problem with subsidized foreign
production. First, Article VI requires that there be imports into the
38 Id., art. XVII, para. 4(a)-(d), at 39.
39 Id., art. XVII, para. 4(a), at 39. The United States has largely complied with its
notification responsibilities. It has submitted notifications concerning U.S. "state trading"
in fissionable materials, helium, the national security stockpile, and various dairy and agri-
cultural products. See State Trading Enterprises: Hearings on S. 2660 Before the Subcomm. on
International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
40 GATT, supra note 1, art. XVII, para. 4(b), at 39.
41 Id, art. XVII, para. 4(c), at 39.
42 Id., art. XVII, para. 4(d), at 39.
43 Id., art. VI, paras. 3 & 6, at 13-14.
44 Id., art. VI, para. 3, at 13-14.
45 Id.
No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of another contracting party
.. .. [C]ountervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty
levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed ... upon
the... production... of any merchandise.
345
346 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 15
United States that benefit from the foreign subsidy.46 While such
imports do occur, much subsidized production from foreign STEs is
absorbed in the producing country, sent to third country markets, or
sold on the London Metal Exchange (LME) or New York Commodity
Exchange (COMEX) and does not enter any "market" directly.
Therefore, the proportion of the output of the subsidized produc-
tion that is reachable through Article VI is limited.47
The second key constraint on the utility of Article VI is the re-
quirement that the effect of the subsidized imports is to cause or
threaten material injury.48 For most industrial products the core of a
CVD injury case tends to be price undercutting by imports benefiting
from foreign subsidies. However, for many mineral products, price
undercutting is difficult to identify as prices are set on a commodity
exchange in response to global supply and demand forces.49 Thus,
even when there are U.S. imports, it can be very difficult to prove a
causal link between foreign subsidies and U.S. industry injury.
Therefore, even though the array of subsidy practices eligible
for remedy action is relatively broad, the utility of Article VI (and the
U.S. CVD law which largely mirrors Article VI) is limited because it
focuses only on imports into the United States that can be proven to
cause injury.
C. Article XVI-Multilateral Discipline
Article XVI imposes certain constraints on foreign government
46 Id., art. VI, para. 7, at 15.
47 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides a limited avenue for addressing the
impact of foreign subsidies in displacing U.S. exports to third countries. Trade Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1954, 2041-43 (1975) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
48 As a measure to encourage countries to become signatories to the GATT Subsidies
Code, U.S. CVD law provides that a U.S. petitioner is required to prove "material injury,"
or threat thereof, only if the respondent country is a Code signatory or has a bilateral
agreement with the United States imposing "substantially equivalent" obligations on the
country. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 701 (a)-(b), 46 Stat. 763, amended by Pub. L. No. 96-
36, 93 Stat. 151, 151-52 (1979) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1988)). While
the injury test is thus avoided for a number of nonsignatories, U.S. law still requires that
there be imports of the subject merchandise into the United States in order to use the
CVD remedy.
49 For noncommodity products, the commercial impact of a subsidy is frequently to
permit a producer to charge a lower price than his competitor; such price undercutting
permits the subsidized producer to take sales away from competitors. However, for glob-
ally traded homogeneous commodities, such as copper, vigorous arbitrage and highly so-
phisticated exchange markets tend to equalize prices around the world very quickly.
Producers tend to sell at the "world market" price, adjusted from freight costs. When
prices fall, it is generally not the result of conscious price undercutting by a producer, but
rather the impact of excess supply for a given level of demand. Therefore, in a CVD injury
investigation regarding such commodities, even a highly subsidized respondent may be
able to claim with a certain basis that he has not taken advantage of his subsidies to charge
an unduly low price; he has merely sold at the prevailing world price. The core of the
problem, however, is the prevailing world price may be low in some measure because of an
excess supply caused by the subsidization of his production.
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subsidy practices; its role is to indicate what signatories should not
do.50 Signatories violating Article XVI provisions or otherwise nulli-
fying benefits to which other signatories are entitled may be subject
to GAIT multilateral discipline through the machinery provided in
Article XXIII.5' The Subsidies Code,52 which was negotiated during
the Tokyo Round, interprets and expands to some degree the provi-
sions of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII.
1. Establishing That STE Production Subsidies Have Harmful
Effects Within the Terms of GATT
Article XVI focuses on the premise that export subsidies and do-
mestic subsidies can have "harmful effects" or cause "serious preju-
dice" to the interests of other countries. 53 A central problem for the
U.S. minerals industry in addressing subsidized production by STEs
is establishing a basis within GATT for declaring that these subsidy
practices have harmful effects for other signatories. The potential
negative results of using subsidies have been categorized by GATT.
Specifically, the GATT Subsidy Code exhorts parties to avoid letting
their subsidies cause "(a) injury to the domestic industry of another
signatory, (b) nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing to
another signatory under [GAT], or (c) serious prejudice to the in-
terests of another signatory. -4 The Code explains that the adverse
effects a signatory must show to demonstrate nullification, impair-
ment, or serious prejudice are:
(a) the effects of subsidized imports in the domestic market of
the importing signatory,
(b) the effect of the subsidy in displacing or impeding the im-
ports of like products into the market of the subsidizing country, or
(c) the effects of subsidized exports in displacing the exports of
like products of another signatory from a third country market. 55
The nature of production subsidies to state-trading producers of
mineral and metal commodity products, however, may make it diffi-
cult to tie such practices directly to these measures of adverse im-
pact. 56 Displacement of exports either to the subsidizing country or
to a third country similarly is not easily proven in situations of STE
overproduction. It is not clear what GATT benefit is being nullified
or impaired or which interest of a signatory is being prejudiced when
the signatory faces continuing STE production during a cyclical
50 GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, at 36-37.
51 Id., art. XXIII, at 55-56.
52 See supra notes 2 and 6 and accompanying text.
53 GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, paras. I & 2, at 36-37.
54 Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 8, para. 3.
55 Id., art. 8, para. 4.
56 See supra note 48 (discussing the difficulties of keying on injury and its reliance on
imports as the medium by which the injury is caused).
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downturn of a commodity product whose price is set on a commodity
exchange.
2. Mineral Products as Nonprimay Products
A basic purpose of Article XVI and the Subsidies Code is to limit
export subsidies. However, GATI only prohibits export subsidies
on nonprimary products. No real limits are placed on the use of ex-
port subsidies for "primary products." 5 7
A problem exists for the minerals industry with regard to the
definition of the term primary product as used in GATT. Article XVI
specifically categorizes mineral products as primary products, thus
they are not subject to the export subsidy prohibition.5 8 In the Sub-
sidies Code, however, a later recategorization of mineral products
clearly placed them in the nonprimary product category and sub-
jected them to the export subsidy prohibition. Therefore, only sig-
natories of the Subsidies Code are barred from using export
subsidies to promote mineral exports.
It is relevant that many significant mineral and metal producing
countries are not signatories to the Subsidies Code. Such non-signa-
tories include: Botswana, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, 59 Morocco,
Peru, South Africa, Zaire, and Zambia.6° While GATT has ninety-six
contracting parties, there are only twenty-four signatories to the
Code.6 1
57 GATr, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 3, at 37. Paragraph 3 only requests that "con-
tracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary prod-
ucts." Id
58 The definition of a primary product is "any product of farm, forest, or fishery, or
any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily
required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade." Id,
notes and supplementary provisions, at art. XVI, § B(2), at 90-91.
During the Tokyo Round the Subsidies Code signatories agreed to delete "mineral
products" from the primary product category. Thus, for Code purposes" 'certain primary
products' means the products referred to in Note Ad Article XVI of the General Agree-
ment, Section B, paragraph 2, with the deletion of the words, 'or any mineral.'" Subsidies
Code, supra note 2, art. 9. The revised definition, however, is only binding with respect to
Code signatories in an action brought under the Code. It is not controlling for purposes
of GATT Article XVI.
59 The United States and Mexico have a bilateral agreement on export subsidies and
countervailing duties which contains a commitment by Mexico to phase out its export sub-
sidies. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,Joint Statement by USTR Brock and Mexi-
can Commercial Secretary Hernandez on Bilateral Trade (Apr. 23, 1985).
60 The countries that are not GATT members would also be free of this restriction.
The two most prominent non-GATT mineral producers are the USSR and China.
61 LAw AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT, supra note 11 . at 28. Some EC members are
parties to the Code through the EC's accession. Article XXXIII defines accession as:
[A] government not party to this Agreement, or a government acting on be-
half of a separate custom territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of
its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for this
agreement, on its own behalf or on the behalf of that territory, on terms to be
agreed between such governments and the contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XXXIII, at 72.
[VOL. 15
1990] SUBSIDIZATION OF STATE-TRADING ENTERPRISES
3. "Special and Differential" Treatment forIs Developed
Countries
The Code also contains a provision that, in essence, may exempt
a less developed country (LDC) from the Code's prohibition in Arti-
cle 9 on export subsidies on nonprimary products.62 Article 14
states that "the commitment of Article 9 shall not apply to develop-
ing country signatories," subject to certain conditions including a
"commitment to reduce or eliminate export subsidies when the use
of such export subsidies is inconsistent with its competitive and de-
velopment needs." s63 It is up to the LDC to determine whether a
particular export subsidy is inconsistent with its competitive and de-
velopment needs.6 4 The only leverage for encouraging LDCs to
make such commitments comes in bilateral agreements with industri-
alized countries, such as the United States, to apply the CVD injury
test to imports from such LDCs only in return for a subsidy-reduc-
tion commitment.65
4. Domestic Subsidies
Domestic subsidies are entirely unregulated under the multilat-
eral provisions of GATT. The only obligation placed on signatories
by Article XVI is to notify GATT7 of the subsidy practice if it acts to
increase exports or decrease imports.66 In the Subsidies Code the
only additional restraint is found in Article 11 which merely requires
signatories to "seek to avoid" causing serious prejudice through the
effects of domestic subsides.6 7 No obligation is imposed to limit the
practices.
The Code does, however, contain general language with a per-
spective that the U.S. minerals industry would like to see applied to
domestic subsidies that benefit STE operations. Article 11 of the
Code, for example, notes that nonexport subsidies can have adverse
consequences "in particular where such subsidies would adversely
affect the conditions of normal competition." 6 8 'By preventing the
supply-dampening effect of market forces during cyclical downturns,
state-trading production subsidies distort the basic conditions of
normal competition. Furthermore, in assessing the impact of their
subsidies, the Code requires signatories to "weigh, as far as practica-
ble, . . . possible adverse effects on trade" 69 and specifically to "con-
sider the conditions of world trade, production (e.g., price, capacity
62 GATT, supra note 1, art. XIV, at 32-33.
63 Id, art. XIV, paras. 2 & 5, at 32, 33.
64 Id, art. XXXVII, para. 4, at 33.
65 See supra note 50.
66 GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI, para. 1, at 36.
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utilization, etc.); and supply in the product concerned."' 70 These
general references are the closest that any GATT language comes to
addressing the problem of state-trading subsidies for production.
Even so, there is no reference to the concepts of cost or recovering
cost.
IV. Possible Revisions of the GAIT Articles or the Subsidies Code
As the subsidy practices related to overproduction by STE min-
eral producers are not currently addressed by the GATT Articles or
the Subsidies Code, revisions in them appear to be necessary if
meaningful discipline on these practices is to be achieved. The revi-
sions suggested here may be pursued individually, although each
item tends to reinforce the disciplinary effect of the others. Some
revisions address the issue of STE overproduction directly while
others would further a general increase on subsidy discipline rele-
vant to a range of subsidy problems. 71
A. Article XVII Concerning STEs
Certain weaknesses of Article XVII can be addressed merely
through new agreements interpreting the current language. 72 How-
ever, to address the key weaknesses in a truly meaningful manner
would require a revision in the text of Article XVII itself. One inter-
pretive issue is whether the fundamental purpose of the article is to
impose additional disciplines on signatories or rather to provide ex-
70 Id.
71 The U.S. Congress has from time to time considered legislation intended to ad-
dress the problems caused by foreign STE practices. On July 21, 1986, Senator Lloyd
Bentsen and eight other senators introduced S. 2660 to address the problem of state trad-
ing. The proposed measure sought to use Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a
mechanism to convince foreign countries to halt STE practices that harmed U.S. interests.
If negotiations with the foreign government failed, the United States would impose sanc-
tions consisting largely of restrictions on U.S. imports from the country concerned. The
legislation implicitly incorporated an interpretation of GATT Article XVII's "commercial
considerations" provision as being applicable to all activities of an STE, not just to the
STE's "purchases or sales." Such an interpretation is at best questionable. See State Trad-
ing Enterprises: Hearings on S. 2660 Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1986) (Statement of Alan Homer, General
Counsel, U.S. Trade Representative). The legislation also had difficulty with the task of
defining with precision what constituted a STE because the proposed unilateral U.S. sanc-
tions did not have a clear basis in GATT Article VII or elsewhere in the GATT. Id. at 1.
72 The U.S. Government appears to have made a decision to avoid making proposals
that require amendment of the text of Article XVII. Reportedly, such an effort is believed
to be too controversial. Therefore, the U.S. proposals regarding Article XVII will be re-
stricted to seeking agreements interpreting the current text. The Department of Com-
merce has publicly stated regarding Article XVII that the United States:
would like to clarify these provisions so as to discourage discriminatory trad-
ing practices by state trading enterprises. The United States is also seeking
to improve GATT's notification provisions to enhance transparency over
state trading practices and plans to submit a proposal on state trading this
fall [1989].
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Int'l Trade Admin., Uruguay Round Update 6-7 (Sept. 1989).
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emptions from other GAT-T disciplines. An agreement that the arti-
cle is meant to impose meaningful additional disciplines would be
very useful. In addition, it would be helpful to reach an agreement
to achieve real compliance with the article's notification require-
ments which have largely been ignored.
Meaningful improvement of Article XVII could be achieved
through three specific changes to the article's text. First, a provision
could be added simply requiring that STEs conduct their operations,
including production, purchases, and sales in accordance with com-
mercial considerations. Second, the concept of operations in accord-
ance with commercial considerations could be defined to include the
recovery of all operating and capital costs. Third, a provision could
state explicitly that the failure of an STE to operate in accordance
with commercial considerations can result in serious prejudice to the
interests of other signatories.
The effect of these additional provisions would be to require
that production decisions be made in accordance with commercial
considerations, that such considerations include the recovery of cost,
and that the failure to do so could be actionable under GATT Article
XXIII.
B. Article VI Concerning Unilateral CVD Action
Efforts to amend Article VI to expand unilateral CVD authority
would be very controversial, particularly given the fact that several
countries reportedly hope to use the Uruguay Round negotiations to
narrow such unilateral rights.73 Relaxing the current requirement
that injury be causally linked to imports would be one possible addi-
tion to Article XVII making some STE production subsidies more
reachable through CVD actions. Another revision might permit the
determination of injury for the minerals industry to be based not on
imports, but on the injury resulting from commodity price suppres-
sion or depression arising from subsidized uneconomic production.
Support for such revision would be very narrow:
C. Article XVI and the Subsidies Code Concerning Multilateral
Disciplines
Article XVI and the Code need to be revised to deal with the
particular problems arising from subsidies to STEs. First, the Code's
Article 3, paragraph 4, explaining the meaning of "nullification or
73 For example, Canada has proposed in the Uruguay Round subsidy negotiations to
exempt from subsidy discipline certain types of government programs, such as "environ-
mental management and conservation" and "regional development assistance" which are
especially relevant to the minerals sector. Multinational Trade Negotiations of the Uru-
guay Round: Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Frameworkfor
Negotiations: Communication from Canada (GATT Pub. No. MTN.GNG/NGIO/W/25) 8-9
(June 28, 1989).
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impairment" and "serious prejudice," could be expanded with an
additional point to the effect that such harm to a signatory can result
from the uneconomic production of commodity products made pos-
sible by subsidization. Thus, the phenomenon of overproduction
leading to excess supply that unreasonably depresses or suppresses
price would become actionable under GATT multilateral discipline
procedures. Uneconomic production would be interpreted as persis-
tent production for which the sales revenue does not permit the re-
covery of operating and capital costs.
Second, for the purposes of Article XVI, as well as the Code,
mineral products should be considered nonprimary products. This
measure would make the mineral production of those countries
which have not yet signed the Code subject to the explicit prohibi-
tion on export subsidies. Third, the special and differential treat-
ment afforded LDCs by the Code could be adjusted to increase the
leverage on LDCs to make commitments to curtail export subsidies
for mineral products. Fourth, aside from the institution of some ba-
sic discipline on domestic subsidies, an agreement might specify that
overproduction of commodity products benefiting from subsidies is
not a permissible practice.
In the Uruguay Round negotiations the U.S. Government has
proposed a "red, yellow, and green light" approach to the domestic
subsidies problem in which certain subsidy practices are per se "pro-
hibited," others are "actionable," and still others are "non-actiona-
ble.174 The key criterion appears in theory to be whether the
subsidy practice has a trade distorting impact. Export subsidies,
which are assumed per se to have a trade distorting impact, are gen-
erally prohibited. Nonactionable subsidies are those presumed to
have no trade distorting effect. Actionable subsidies are those whose
impact on trade depends on the particular circumstances involved.
From the U.S. minerals industry's perspective, mineral produc-
tion subsidy practices ideally would be presumed to be trade dis-
torting and thereby prohibited. However, it is quite important to
assure the explicit inclusion of such practices at least in the actiona-
ble category, where the minerals industry has the opportunity to
demonstrate the trade distorting effect of the subsidy. To ignore
such subsidies, or to consider them nonactionable would increase
the vulnerability of the U.S. minerals industry to the impact of subsi-
dized STE operations.
V. Conclusion
The Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations provide an opportunity
74 See generally Multinational Trade Negotiations of the Uruguay Round: Negotiating
Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Elements of the Framework for Negotiations:
Submissions by the United States (GATT Pub. No. MTN.GNG/NGIO/W/29) (Nov. 22, 1989).
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to achieve some measure of discipline over government subsidy
practices that benefit STE operations and promote uneconomic min-
eral production. However, the achievement of meaningful discipline
will require changes to the GATT? articles and the Subsidies Code
that may be quite controversial. Nonetheless, as GATT currently
provides no limitation on such production subsidy practices-
outside of the unilateral CVD rights under Article VI-the U.S. Gov-
ernment should make the achievement of additional disciplines a
high priority.

